Epinomis

by Plato

translated by George Burges (1855)


Persons of the Dialogue: an Athenian Stranger, Cleinias (a Cretan), Megillus (a Lacedaemonian).

CLEINIAS:

According to our agreement, we have all of us, guest, come correctly, being three, I, and you, and Megillus here, to consider the question of intellect, in what manner it is meet to go through in a discourse that, which we say belongs to the constitution of man, and which, when it has been thought upon, causes it to be in the best state with regard to itself, as far as it is possible for man to possess it. For, as we assert, we have gone through all the other matters, that existed, relating to the laying down of laws. But that, which is of the greatest moment to discover and to speak of, namely, by learning what will a mortal man become wise, this we have neither spoken of nor discovered. Now then let us endeavour not to leave this behind. For we should nearly do that imperfectly, for the sake of which we have all rushed onwards, with the view of making clear every thing from the beginning to the end.

ATHENIAN:

You speak well, friend Cleinias. But I think you will now hear a strange discourse, and on the other hand in a certain respect not strange. For many, who meet us in life, tell the same story, that the human race will be neither blessed nor happy. Follow me, then, and see whether to you I likewise appear together with them to speak correctly on a point like this. I assert then that it is not possible for men, except a few, to be blessed and happy; I limit this to as long as we live; but there is a fair hope that a person will after death obtain every thing, for the sake of which he would desire, when alive, to live in the best manner he could, and dying to meet with such an end. And I assert nothing very wise, but what all of us, both Greeks and Barbarians, after a certain manner know, that to be produced is at the beginning difficult for every animal. In the first place, it is difficult to partake of the state of conception, next to be born, and, further still, to be brought up and educated; for all these things take place, as we all say, through ten thousand troubles. The time too would be short, not only with respect to the calculation of annoyances, but what every one would imagine to be moderate; and this seems to make almost a kind of breathing-time in the middle of the life of man. Old age however, quickly overtaking a person, would make him not at all willing to live his life over again, after he has considered the life he has lived, unless he happens to be full of the thoughts of a child. Now of this what is to me the proof? It is, because what is sought for in our discourse exists naturally in this way. Now we are seeking by what manner we shall become wise, as if there were to each of us some such power as this. But it flies quickly away then, when any one proceeds to an investigation of the so-called arts or notions, or any other things of that kind, which we imagine to be sciences; whereas not one of them is worthy to be called by the name of that wisdom, which is conversant with the affairs of man; while on the other hand, the soul is very confident, and divines, as if this wisdom were existing in her by some gift of nature; but what it is, and when, and how it exists, it is wholly unable to discover. Does not then in this manner our difficulty about, and search after, wisdom, seem somehow greatly to be full of the hope, which exists to each of those amongst us, who are able to examine both themselves prudently, and others harmoniously, through reasonings of all kinds and spoken in every manner? Shall we agree that these things are not thus, or thus?

CLEINIAS:

We will agree in this, O guest, in the hope perhaps, which will arise in the course of time, of having hereafter with you opinions the most true on these points.

ATHENIAN:

We must then first go through the other sciences, as they are called, but which do not render him wise, who receives and possesses them, in order that, by putting them out of the way, we may endeavour to place by our side those, of which we are in want, and, after placing them by our side, learn them.

Let us, then, first look into the sciences, of which the race of man is first in want; since these are nearly the most necessary, and truly the first. Now he, who becomes skilled in these, even though he seemed at first to be wise, yet now he is not considered to be wise, but obtains rather a disgrace by a science of this kind. We will therefore mention what they are, and show that nearly every one, to whom is proposed the contest of seeming to become the best man, avoids them through the possession of intellect and study. Let the first art then be that which, withdrawing us from eating human flesh, that, as the story goes, took place formerly amongst mankind after the manner of savage animals, has recalled us to a more lawful food. And may those before be propitious to us, and they are. For whosoever we are, who have spoken, let them be bidden the first farewell. The manufacture of wheaten flour and barley meal and moreover the food is indeed beautiful and good; but it will never be able to work out the man completely wise. For this very thing, under the appellation of a manufacture, would produce a difficult handling of the things manufactured. Nor would the cultivation of nearly the whole country do so; for we all appear to take in hand the earth, not by art, but by nature, according to a god. Nor yet would the weaving together of dwellings nor the whole of house-building, and the manufacture of all kinds of utensils, and copper-work, and the preparing of instruments for carpenters and moulders, and weavers, and trades in general, although possessing what is useful for the common people, be suited for virtue. Nor yet does the whole of hunting, although various and full of art, contribute what is greatly becoming together with what is wise. Nor yet does the diviner's and interpreter's art at all; for such merely knows what is said, but has not learnt whether it is true. Since then we see that the possession of necessaries is worked out indeed by art, but that not one of these arts makes any person wise, there would be left after this a certain sport, imitative for the most part, but by no means a serious pursuit. For persons do with many instruments, and with many imitations, effected by their own bodies, not altogether graceful, make an imitation of things, expressed in prose and verse, and of those, of which painting is the mother, while colours many and various are worked out, by many substances moist and dry by operating upon none of which with the greatest care does the imitative art render a person wise. And when all has been done, there would be something remaining in the assistance without number given to persons without number; the greatest of which and for the most numerous occasions is the art of war, called by the name of generalship, of the highest repute in the case of need, but requiring the greatest good fortune, and that which is assigned naturally rather to bravery than wisdom. And what persons call the medical art is surely itself an assistance nearly of such ills as the seasons cause by cold and unseasonable heat, and make by all such matters, the nature of animals their spoil. But not one of these arts is in good repute for the truest wisdom; for being made the subject of conjecture, they are carried along without measure by opinions. And assistants we will call pilots and sailors likewise. But not one of these let any person, by cheating us with words, proclaim a wise man on every ground. For not one of them would know the rage of the winds or their kindness, which is the most acceptable thing in the whole of the pilot's art. Nor yet such as say they are assistants in lawsuits by their power in speaking, and, by their memory and practice, give their minds to unusual opinions, but stumble outside the truth in cases of real justice. There still remains a certain strange power with respect to the opinion of wisdom, which the many would then call by the name of nature rather than wisdom, when any one perceives that he is easily learning, what even a child could learn, and is remembering many things and firmly so, and can call to mind what is suited to each thing, and quickly do it, when it would be becoming, if it took place. Now all this some will place under nature, others under wisdom, and others under a cleverness of nature. But no prudent person would ever be willing to call any one of these a truly wise man.

It is however necessary for a certain science to become apparent, by which he, who possesses it, would be wise in reality, and not be so in opinion merely. Let us, then, consider. For we are endeavouring by a reasoning, difficult in every way, to find some other science beyond those already mentioned, which may be truly and with propriety called wisdom; while he, who receives it, will be a person neither vulgar nor silly, but wise and good through it; and, whether he governs or is governed by the state, in justice become an elegant person.

Let us, therefore, consider that science first, which singly proceeds from human nature, and which, amongst all that are present, would, by not being present, render the race of man of all animals the most senseless and thoughtless. Now this it is not very difficult for anyone to consider. For that, which has given number to the whole race of man, would, so to say, being compared one against one, effect this. I conceive however that a certain god himself, rather than a certain accident, gave it to us to preserve us; but whom I conceive to have been the god, it is necessary to state, strange although it be, and, on the other hand, somehow not strange. For how must we not conceive that he, who is the cause to us of every good thing, should not have been the cause likewise of intellect, the greatest good by far? Now what god am I speaking of, Megillus and Cleinias, and making an object of worship? It is almost Heaven, whom it is most just we should honour, as all the other daemons and gods do, and pray pre-eminently to it. For all of us would confess that it is the cause of all good things to us. And we assert to boot that it has given us number, and will give it us still, if any one is willing to follow us. For if a person will proceed to a right view of it, whether it be the pleasure of any one to call it the World, or Olympus, or Heaven, let him so call it; but let him follow, wherever it assumes a varied form, when it causes the stars in it to revolve along all their courses, and when it imparts the seasons and food for all, and the remaining gift of intellect, as we should say, together with all number, and every other good. Now this is the greatest thing, when anyone, receiving from it the gift of number, proceeds through every period. Returning back still a little in our discourse, let us call to mind that we have conceived very correctly, that if we take away number from human nature, we should be intellectual not at all. For the soul of the animal, from whom reason is absent, would scarcely any longer be able to receive every virtue. Now the animal, which does not know two and three, even and odd, and is entirely ignorant of number, would never be able to give a reason respecting those things, of which it alone possesses sensation and memory; but nothing hinders it from possessing the other virtues, fortitude and temperance. But he, who is deprived of true reason, will never become wise and he, to whom wisdom is not present, which is the greatest part of the whole of virtue, would never be perfectly good, nor happy. In this way there is every necessity for number to be laid down as a principle. But why it is necessary, there would be a discourse longer than all that has been spoken. And correctly will the present one have been stated likewise, that of the things, mentioned as belonging to the other arts, which we have gone through, and permitted them all to be arts, not even one would remain, but all perish entirely, when any one takes away the science of numbers. But to some of those, who have looked to the arts, the race of man would appear sufficiently for the sake of some small matters to have no need of number. And yet is it a thing of moment. And if any one looks to what is divine and mortal in generation, in which piety towards the gods and true number are known, he could not mention the person, who knows the whole of number, and of what power it is, when present, the cause; since it is evident that what relates to all music, requires numbered motion and sound and, what is the greatest, that it is the cause of all good things, but of nothing evil, this must be known well, which would perhaps take place by another road for the movement, which is without reason, and order, and shape, and rhythm, and harmony, and all such things as partake of any evil, is deficient in nearly all number. And this it is meet for him to conceive in this way, who is about to end his days happily; and no one, except him, who knows the just, the good, the beautiful, and all such things, and has laid hold of a true opinion respecting them, will through number know how with regard to any thing to persuade himself and others at all.

Let us then proceed to consider this very thing, how we learnt to number. Say, from whence did it arise that we have understood one and two? Do persons possess from the creator a nature of this kind towards their being able to understand them? Nature, indeed, has not been present to many other animals for this very purpose, so that they are able to learn from their father to number; but the deity has established within us this very thing first, so as to be competent to understand what is shown to us; and afterwards he showed it and is still showing; of which things what can a person see one, as compared with one, more beautiful than the birth of day? and then, when he comes to the portion of night, he will have a sight, from whence every thing will appear to him quite different. And when he ceases not revolving upon these very matters for many days and many nights, he will see how Heaven ceases not in teaching men one and two, until even the most hard to learn shall learn sufficiently how to number. For thus each of us, on perceiving these, would understand three and four and many. And amongst these the deity has formed one thing, the Moon; which at one time appearing greater, and at another less, proceeds through her path, showing continually another day up to fifteen days and nights. And this is a period, if any one is willing to establish the whole circle as one; so that the most indocile animal, so to say, would learn to number, if it were one, to whom the deity had imparted the nature of being able to learn. And up to these points, and in these matters, the whole mass of animals have the power to become skilled in numbers, by considering one thing, itself by itself. But always to reckon up all numbers, when compared with each other, I think is a greater work. And for the sake of this, the deity having formed, as we have said, the Moon, increasing and decreasing, has put together months into the year, and caused us to compare every number with number, with a prosperous fortune. Hence, there are fruits for us, and the earth has become pregnant, so that there is food for all animals; while winds and showers take place, neither out of season nor measure. But if any thing occurs contrary to this on the side of evil, it is meet to accuse not the divine, but human, nature, as unjustly distributing its own life. Now to us, while we were investigating the laws, it appeared, that the other things, which are nearly the best for man, are easy for us to know; and that everyone would be competent to understand what was said, and to do it, if he knew what is that, which is likely to be a benefit, and what is not. But it has appeared, and now appears still, that all the other pursuits are not very difficult; but in what manner it is meet for men to become good, is very difficult. And, again, to acquire all the rest of good things, as the saying is, it is both possible and not difficult; but with respect to substance, how much is requisite and not requisite, and with respect to the body, how much is requisite and not requisite, and with respect to the soul, that it ought to be good, every one agrees with everyone. But in what manner it ought to be good, everyone when asked answers, by being just, and temperate, and brave, and this but in what manner to be wise, or what wisdom is, not one, as we just now observed, agrees at all with one of the many. Now therefore, besides all the previous kinds of wisdom, we have discovered one, by no means vile for this very purpose, that he, who has learnt what we have discussed, will seem to be wise; but whether he, who is skilled on these points, is wise and good, on this it is requisite to hold a discussion.

CLEINIAS:

How reasonably, guest, did you say, that you are endeavouring to speak greatly about great things!

ATHENIAN:

For they are not trifling things, Cleinias; and, what is still more difficult, they are in every respect and entirely true.

CLEINIAS:

Very much so, guest; but do not however be faint-hearted in stating what you mean.

ATHENIAN:

Truly so; nor do you in hearing.

CLEINIAS:

This shall be; for I will speak to you for both of us.

ATHENIAN:

It is well. But it is necessary, as it seems, to speak first of all from the beginning, especially if we are able to comprehend in one name what is that, which we consider to be wisdom; but if we are quite unable, to consider in the second place, what and how many are the arts through which he, who receives them, will, according to our story, be a wise man.

CLEINIAS:

Say on.

ATHENIAN:

What follows after this will be without blame to the legislator who, making a conjecture about the gods, speaks more beautifully and better than those, who have spoken before; and who passes his life in making use, as it were, of a beautiful discipline, and honouring the gods, and exalting them with hymns, and felicity, and thus passes through life.

CLEINIAS:

Well and beautifully are you speaking, guest; may the end of your laws be this, that after falling down before the gods, and passing a life the most pure, you may meet with its close the best and the most beautiful.

ATHENIAN:

How then shall we speak, Cleinias? Does it not seem to you that we honour the gods greatly by hymning them, and by praying that it may come into your minds to say things the most beautiful and the best respecting them? Say you in this way, or how?

CLEINIAS:

In this way, wonderfully. But do thou, O godlike man, confiding in the gods, offer up a prayer, and speak the one amongst your beautiful speeches that comes into your mind relating to the gods and goddesses.

ATHENIAN:

This shall be, if the deity himself be our leader. Do you only pray with me.

CLEINIAS:

Say then what is to follow this.

ATHENIAN:

It is necessary then, as it seems, for me, since those, who have gone before, have represented improperly the generation of gods and of animals, to give in the first place, according to our former reasoning, a better representation, by resuming the discourse, which I took in hand against impious assertions, and to assert that there are gods, who have a care for all things both small and great; and that they are not to be softened down by those, who are engaged in unjust acts, if you remember, Cleinias; for you took down a memorandum of it for what was then said was very true. But this was the greatest, that every soul is older than every body. Do you not remember? or this at least perfectly, that what is better, and older, and more divine, is credibly prior to that, which is worse, and younger, and less honourable; and in every way that what governs, is prior to what is governed; and that what leads, to what is led. Let us then receive this at least, that soul is older than body. Now if this be the case, it is more credible that, what is first in the generation of the first, would be almost the beginning; and let us lay down that the beginning exists in a more becoming manner than a beginning, and that we have most correctly come upon the greatest parts of wisdom, relating to the generation of the gods.

CLEINIAS:

Let these things be stated to the best of our power.

ATHENIAN:

Come, then, let us assert that an animal is said most truly to exist according to nature then, when one combination of soul and body coming together produces one form.

CLEINIAS:

Correctly so.

ATHENIAN:

A thing of this kind then is most justly called an animal.

CLEINIAS:

It is.

ATHENIAN:

Now it is requisite, according to a probable account, for five solid bodies to be mentioned, from which a person might model the most beautiful and best of things; but the whole of the other genus possesses one form. For there is nothing else, which can be generated without a body, and possessing in no respect and at no time colour, except the really most divine genus of soul. Now this is nearly that alone, to which it pertains to mould and fabricate; but it belongs to body, as we call it, to be moulded and produced, and to be visible. But to the other soul — for let us say it again, since it is to be said not merely once, — it pertains to be invisible, and to know and to be intelligible, and to have a share of memory and of the reasoning power in the changes of even and odd. As there are, therefore, five bodies, it is requisite to say that fire is the first, and water the second, and air the third, and earth the fourth, and aether the fifth; and in the dominions of each of these there is produced many an animal and of every kind. Now it is meet to learn this singly, thus. Let us, in the first place, lay down the whole of the things of earth as one, namely, all human beings, and all such animals as are with many feet, or none, and such as can move on, and such as are stationary, as being held down by roots. And it is requisite to consider the one thing belonging to it as this, that all these are formed of all those genera, but that the greater part is of the earth and the nature of solidity. It is, however, requisite to lay down another kind of animal, which is generated, and, at the same time, able to be seen. For it consists for the most part of fire; but contains likewise a small portion of earth and air, and of all the other things. Hence, it is requisite to assert that animals of every kind and visible are generated from them. It is necessary likewise to think that all in the heavens are these genera of animals, which it is necessary to say is the whole divine race of the stars, consisting of a most beautiful body, and of a soul the most happy and the best. It is requisite moreover to impact to them, at least in opinion, one of two fates. For each of them is either indestructible and immortal, and altogether, from every necessity, divine, or possesses some long-aged life of life, sufficient for each, than which there would be never any need of more.

Let us then consider first, that there are, as we have said, these two kinds of animals; and let us say again that both of them are visible, the one being, as it would seem, wholly of fire, and the other of earth, and that the earthy is moved in a disorderly manner, but the fiery in all order. Now it is meet to consider that, what is moved without order, is senseless, as the animal, which is around us, acts for the most part but that, what has its going in order and in the heavens, it is meet to make for ourselves as a great proof of its being intellectual; for it goes on ever according to the same and in a similar manner; and by doing and suffering it would afford a sufficient proof of its living intellectually. Now the necessity of a soul possessing intellect would be by far the greatest of all necessities. For it lays down laws as governing, and not governed. But when soul, which is a thing the best, deliberates according to the best intellect, that, which is not to be changed by turning, comes out perfect in reality according to intellect; and even adamant would not be superior to such a soul, and less to be changed by turning. But in reality the three Fates hold and guard, so as to be perfect, that, which has been deliberated upon by each of the gods with the best counsel. It was necessary therefore that there should be to man a proof that the stars are endued with intellect through the whole of their progression, because they always do the same things, through its having been planned of old that they are to do so for some wondrous length of time, and through a change not taking place in the plan, by their doing some things at one time, and others at another, and by wandering up and down and altering their orbit. Now the very reverse of this has appeared to the majority of us, that, by their doing the same things and in a similar manner, they have not a soul. The masses, too, have followed persons so senseless, as to conceive that the human race is intellectual and vital, as being moved, but the divine race unintellectual, as remaining in the same movements. But it is allowable for the man, who places himself on the side of what is more beautiful, and better, and more agreeable to the gods, to conceive that he ought, on this very account, to consider as intellectual that, which does always the same things according to the same and in a similar manner and that this is the nature of the stars, most beautiful to behold, and which by a progression and dance, the most beautiful and magnificent of all choirs, completes for all animals what is needful. Now to show that we are justly saying they possess a soul, let us consider first their size. For they are not in reality so small, as they appear to be; but each of them is of immense bulk, as is worthy to be believed; for this is admitted by competent demonstrations. For it is possible to conceive correctly that the whole Sun is larger than the whole earth, and that all the stars, which are borne along, possess a wonderful size. Let us then take into our thoughts what would be the method of any nature in causing so great a bulk to revolve for ever for the same time that it revolves at present. Now I assert that a god would be the cause, and that it could not be possible otherwise. For it would not otherwise become animated than through a god, as we have shown. But since a god is able in this respect, to him there has been every facility for every animal, in the first place, to be produced, and every body, and every bulk; and next, to cause them to move in that way, which he conceived to be the best. And now upon all these points we will make one true assertion. It is impossible for the earth and heavens and all the stars and all the bulky bodies made from them to subsist, unless a soul were present to each, or in each, so that they proceed with such accuracy according to years, and months, and days, and for every good, which is produced, to be produced for us all. But it is requisite that, by how much the more vile is man, the less ought he to be seen to trifle, but to assert something clear concerning them. Should then any one assert that certain violent motions of bodies or natures or any thing of this kind are the causes, he will say nothing that is clear.

It is however requisite to reconsider seriously what we have said, whether our discourse has a reason for it, or altogether comes after it. In the first place then, we said, there are two things, the one, soul, and the other, body, and that many things pertain to each; but that all are different from one another, and each from each and that there is no other third; thing common to any one; and that soul differs from body and that the former is intellectual, but the latter unintellectual and that the one rules, but the other is ruled; and that the one is the cause of all that happens, but the other is not the cause of any accident so that to assert that the things in heaven were generated by something else, and that the productions of soul and body do not exist in this way, is a great folly and a want of reason. If then it is requisite for the reasons, relating to all such matters, to be victorious, and for all things of this kind to seem confidently to be divine, we must lay down one or the other of these two points; we must either hymn those things most correctly, as being gods themselves, or we must consider them, like images, to be resemblances of the gods, the gods themselves having manufactured them. For they are the works of artificers neither senseless nor of little worth. But, as we have said, we must lay down one or the other of these points. And what is laid down, we must honour pre-eminently before all statues. For never will there be seen statues more beautiful and more common of all men, or put up in pre-eminent places, and excelling for their purity, and solemnity, and the whole of life, than are these, how they have been generated altogether in this way. Let us then endeavour to prove so much, at least, relating to the gods, by perceiving that these are the two visible animals, of which we have spoken, one immortal; but the whole of the other has been created of the earth, mortal; and let us attempt to speak of the three, which are in the midst of the five between them, and exist according to reasonable opinion, most clearly. For after fire let us place aether; and let us lay down that from it the soul moulds animals, which possess a power, like some other genera, the greater portions from their own nature, but the smaller portions, for the sake of a link, from other genera; and after the aether that soul moulds from air another genus of animals, and a third from water. And it is probable that soul, after it had fabricated all these, filled the whole of heaven with living matter, by making use, to the best of its power, of all genera, since all of them exist, partakers of life; but that the second and the third, and the fourth and the fifth, beginning their generation from the gods who are manifest, end in us, who are men.

The gods, then, Zeus and Juno, and all the rest, let any one place where he pleases, according to the same law and let him consider this reasoning as fixed.

We must call therefore the nature of the stars, and such things as we perceive existing together with the stars, the visible gods, the greatest and the most worthy of honour, and who as seeing on every side the most acutely, are the first in rank. And after them, and under them in due order, it is very meet to honour with prayers the daemons, for the sake of their silent going to and fro, an aerial genus, that occupies a third and middle seat, and is the cause of interpreting. But of these two kinds of living beings, one formed of aether, and the other in due order of air, neither of them is entirely visible; and though present and near at hand, they do not become manifest to us; but let us say that, participating in a wonderful intelligence, as being docile and of a good memory, they know all our thoughts; and that in a wonderful manner they love the honourable and good man amongst us, and hate excessively the wicked, as being himself a sharer in pain for the deity, who possesses the completion of a divine allotment, is placed beyond these two, pleasure and pain, but has had a share in thinking upon and knowing, according to all things. And as the heaven is full of living beings, they interpret to each other and the highest gods all things and in all ways, through the living beings in the middle being carried to earth and through the whole of heaven with a light and rapid motion. But he, who assimilates the fifth genus of living beings, which is from water, to a demigod, will assimilate rightly; and this genus is sometimes visible, and sometimes concealed from view; but when visible, it exhibits a wonder through an obscure vision. Since then there are these five kinds of living beings really existing, in whatever manner any of us meets with them, falling in with them in a dream, in an interpretation of a dream, or spoken by oracles and prophecies to some in hearing, healthy or sick, or being met with at the close of life, and opinions being present privately and publicly, from whence many sacred rites of many have taken place, and some will take place; of all these the legislator, who possesses even the smallest particle of mind, will never dare, by making innovations towards a god-worship, which does not possess something clear, to overturn his own state; nor will he, knowing nothing at all himself, forbid any portion of what the law of his country has spoken, on the subject of the gods. For it is not possible for human nature to know any thing on points of this kind. And does not the same reason hold good, that those are the worst of men, who do not dare to speak to us of the gods really existing in a manifest form, and to make them manifest, by permitting the other gods to be without sacred rites, and not to receive the honours that are due to them? But now there happens a thing of this kind to take place, as if some one of us had seen the Sun and Moon existing and looking upon all of us; and, although able to speak, had not said that they remained still sharing in no honours; nor was he anxious for his part to bring them into a place of honour, nor to cause festivals and sacrifices to take place for them; nor, through the computed time, to distribute to each of them the seasons of frequently longer and shorter years. Would not such a one, if he were said to be bad both to himself and to any other, who knew him, be justly said to be so?

CLEINIAS:

How not, guest, as being the worst of men?

ATHENIAN:

Know then, friend Cleinias, that this very thing has now happened respecting myself.

CLEINIAS:

How say you?

ATHENIAN:

Know that amongst those, relating to the whole heaven, there are eight powers, sisters to each other, on which I have looked; and yet I have done nothing of consequence; for this is easy even to another person. Of these there are three, one of the Sun, one of the Moon, and one of the not-wandering stars, which I mentioned a little before, and there are five others. With respect to all these, and the gods in them, whether they move of themselves, or are carried along in cars, let not one of us all think even that some are gods, and others not; nor yet, that some of them are genuine, but others such as it is not lawful for any of us to mention; but let us all say that they are all of them brothers, and live in fraternal allotments; and let us honour them, not one for a year, and another for a month, nor let us ordain for others any allotment or time, in which each proceeds through its revolution, and completes the arrangement, which reason, the most divine of all, has ordained to be visible; and which he, who is under a good daemon, has first wondered at, and then felt a desire to learn, as much as it is possible for a mortal nature, from thinking that he shall thus pass through life in the best and most fortunate manner, and after death arrive at places adapted to virtue and being thus truly initiated and in reality participating in prudence, one in one, will pass the rest of his time as a holy spectator of things the most beautiful, as far as sight is concerned.

It now remains for us to state after this how many and what they are. For we shall not be seen to be false. Thus far at least I firmly insist upon. For I say again, that of these there are eight; and that of the eight, three have been already spoken of, and there are five still remaining. Now the fourth and fifth onward movement and oblique path are nearly equal in velocity with the Sun, and are neither slower nor swifter. And let us say that he, who possesses intellect, is altogether competent to lead these three; and that these movements belong to the Sun and Lucifer. But the third it is not possible to speak of by name, through its not being known; and the reason of this, that the person, who first saw it, was a Barbarian. For an ancient place was the nurse of those, who first thought of these matters, in consequence of the beauty of the summer season, which Egypt and Syria possess sufficiently, enabling persons to look upon all the stars, visible, so to say, perpetually; inasmuch as they dwelt in a part of the world at a distance from clouds and rain. Hence to every where else and hither too has reached what has been tested by the time of thousands of years, and even infinite and on this account it is meet with confidence to lay down these matters as laws. For to think that divine natures are not to be held in honour, or that these are not divine, is clearly the province of persons not endued with intellect. It is necessary however for this to be assigned as the reason, why they have no names with the masses for they have appellations with some divine persons. For Lucifer and Hesperus, being the same, have the appellation almost of Venus, and are very well suited to a Syrian name-giver. But the star, which revolves with an equal velocity with the Sun and this, has the name almost of Mercury. And further, let us speak of three onward movements of those stars, that take their course to the right hand, together with the Sun and Moon. But it is requisite to call the eighth orb one, which a person may most correctly call the upper world, which proceeds contrary to all those, and draws the others along with it, as it would appear to persons who know little on these matters; but what we know sufficiently, it is necessary to speak of, and we do speak. For wisdom really existing is somehow in this way apparent to him, who has a share, although a small one, of consciousness correct and divine. Three stars then remain, one of which differs from the rest by the slowness of its motion. Some call it by the name of Phaenon [Saturn]; but that, which is after this in slowness, it is meet to call Phaethon [Jupiter]; and after this follows Puroeis [Mars], which has the reddest colour of all. Of these things when a person is speaking, it is not difficult to have a notion; but after learning, it is requisite to think of them, as we have said.

This however it is necessary for every Greek to have in his thoughts, that we inhabit a spot, belonging to the Greeks, nearly the best, as regards virtue. But it is proper to say that it deserves praise for being situated in the middle of the natural qualities of summer and winter. But though its nature, as regards summer, falls short of that, which belongs to the region there, as I have stated, it gave subsequently to them the mental perception relating to these gods of the world. Let us then admit that, whatever the Greeks have received from the Barbarians, they work it out to a more beautiful end. And the very same notion we ought to have with respect to what has been said now, that it is difficult to discover all matters of this kind without feeling a doubt. There is however a hope, both much and glorious, that the Greeks will respect all these divinities in a manner more beautiful and more just than the tradition, which has come from the Barbarians, by employing both discipline and the Delphic oracles and every attention according to the laws. Nor let any Greek be afraid of this, that mortals ought not to busy themselves about divine matters; but to think quite the contrary of this, that the deity is not senseless, nor ignorant of human nature but knows that, where he teaches, man will follow, and learn what has been taught; and that he surely knows that he does teach us this very thing, and that we learn both number and to number. For being ignorant of this, he would be the most stupid of all beings. For, according to the saying, he would in reality be ignorant of himself, if he were annoyed at a person able to learn, and did not rejoice without a feeling of envy at a person becoming good through a god. Now there is a reason great and good for supposing that, when men had their first notions about the gods, how they existed, and of what kind they were, and what actions they took in hand, ideas were then broached, not to the mind of the moderate, nor agreeable to them, nor even of those, who were next after them amongst whom what relates to fire and water and the other bodies, was said to be the most ancient; but posterior to them the wonderful soul; and that the movement, which the body has obtained by lot, is better and of more value for carrying on both itself and soul by the aid of heat and cold, and all things of that kind; but that the soul could not do so to body and itself. But now, when we say that soul exists, if it exists in body, it would be not at all wonderful for it to move and carry about both the body and itself; nor would, according to any reason, soul be believed to to be unable to carry a weight. Since then soul is the cause of the universe, and of all good things being such, and on the other hand of evil things being such, it is not at all wonderful that soul should be the cause of every bearing on and movement; but that the bearing on and movement towards the good belongs to the best soul, but the bearing on and movement towards the contrary, to a contrary soul and that it is necessary for the good to have vanquished, and to vanquish still, what are not of this kind. Hence let these be the assertions of us, now thinking in this way; all of which has been stated with reference to Justice, the punisher of the impious. With respect however to that, which has been brought to a test, it is not possible for us to disbelieve, that we ought not to consider the good to be wise.

Let us then see, whether to this wisdom, of which we were of old in search, we can direct our mind either by education or art and being wanting in the knowledge of which we should be ignorant of things just. Being such we seem to me, and we must speak. For after seeking up and down, I will endeavour to make it at the end plain to you in the way it has become very plain to myself. The greatest part of virtue, when it is not practised correctly, becomes the cause of ignorance, as, from what has been said, the thing itself seems to me to signify forcibly. But let no one persuade us, that there is any part of virtue belonging to the race of mortals greater than piety. Now that this does not exist in the best natures through ignorance, we must declare since the best are those, which are produced with the greatest difficulty, and which, when produced, are of the greatest benefit. For the soul, that receives moderately and mildly what belongs to a nature slow and the reverse, would be of an easy disposition; and admiring fortitude, and being obedient towards temperance, and, what is the greatest in these natures, able to learn, and with a good memory, it would be able to rejoice much in things of this kind, so as to be a lover of learning. For these things are not easy to be produced; and when they are produced, and meet with the nurture and education of which there is a need, they would be able to keep down most correctly the most part of their inferiors, by instructing them to do and say respecting the gods each of the matters that are requisite, and when they are requisite, relating to sacrifices and purifications, connected with gods and men, and not to make use of artifice in outward shows, but to honour virtue in truth, which is of all things of the greatest moment to every state. This part, therefore, we say is naturally the most important; and if there be a person to teach, it is able to be learnt in the most beautiful and best manner possible. But no one can be a teacher unless a god leads the way. If however a person teaches any thing correctly, but does not perform any thing of this kind in a fitting manner, it is better not to learn. However, from what has been said, it is necessary to learn these things, and for me to say that a nature of this kind is the best. Let us then endeavour to go through by a discourse what these are, and of what kind, and how it is requisite to learn them, both according to my ability, who am the speaker, and the ability of those, who are able to hear, in what manner a person may learn some things about god-worship. It is a thing almost absurd for the hearer. But we mention its name, which is, what a person through his ignorance of the subject would not imagine, astronomy. Are you then ignorant that the person, who is truly an astronomer, is necessarily the most wise? Not, indeed, he, who is an astronomer according to Hesiod, and all such, and looks to risings and settings, but he, who looks to the circle of the eight orbits, and the seven under the first, while each is going through its own orbit in such a way, that no nature would be competent to contemplate them easily, unless it partook of a wonderful nature, as we have just now said, and say to those, to whom we are stating what it is meet to learn, and how. Let this be mentioned first by us.

The Moon goes through its orbit the quickest, and first leads on the month and the full moon. The second it is meet to consider is the Sun, that leads on the solstices through the whole of its orbit, and those that describe their course together with it. But that we may not frequently converse in the same way about the same things, the other orbits, which we mentioned before, and which it is not easy to comprehend, we ought to contemplate and for these objects it is requisite to prepare natures, such as can exist, by teaching them many things beforehand, and accustoming the party, while a boy or youth, to labour thoroughly at what is requisite. On this account there would be a need of mathematics; but the greatest and first need is of numbers in the abstract, and not of such as are connected with bodies, but of the whole generation and power of the even and the odd, so much as they contribute to the nature of things that exist. Now to him, who learns this, there comes in due order what we call very ridiculously by the name of geometry. But the similitude of numbers, that are naturally not similar to each other, becomes conspicuous, when applied to the properties of plain surfaces; which wonderful thing, not of human but divine origin, will appear very clear to him, who is able to think. And after this, those numbers, that are increased by a triple ratio, and are similar to the nature of a solid, and those, that are on the other hand dissimilar, and are by another art similar to this, which those, who are conversant with it, call stereometry, to be considered: which is indeed a thing divine and wonderful to those, who look into it that, while the power is ever revolving about the double, and that which is from the opposite to this, according to each analogy does every nature fashion out for itself a species and genus. Now the first power of the double, according to number, proceeds, according to proportion through one to two, possessing a double by power. But that, which, as regards the solid and tangible, is again a double, proceeds from one to eight. But that of the double quantity to the middle, and perhaps, what is more than the less, and less than the greater while the other by the same part surpasses, and is surpassed by the extremes. But in the middle of six to twelve, there is found the sesquialter and sesquitertian proportions. And in the middle of these, a power, turned to both, has distributed to men a use, where voice and measure are combined, for the sake of sports, rhythm, and harmony, after having been granted to the happy dancing of the Muses.

Let all these then be held to take place in this way, and let them exist. But as regards the finish to this, let us proceed to the divine generation and the most beautiful and divine nature of things visible, as far as a deity has granted to man to look upon them; which nature, no one, after having beheld, will boast of having received with facility without the particulars mentioned above. Besides this, in our several intercourse we must refer every individual thing to its species, and all things to one, by asking questions and disproving what has been not correctly asserted. For this is truly a touchstone the most beautiful and thoroughly the first amongst men but in the case of such, as are not touchstones, and only pretend to be, there is a labour the most vain of all.

Further still, the accuracy of time must be considered by us, and how exactly it completes all that takes place in heaven; so that he, who believes the assertion to be true, that soul is a thing older and more divine than body, would also conceive it has been very beautifully and sufficiently said, that all things are full of gods; and that we have never been neglected through the forgetfulness or carelessness of superior beings. But as regards all such things as these, we should bear this in mind, that, if any one apprehends correctly each of these matters, there will be a great benefit to him, who has apprehended them; but if not, that it will be better for him to be ever calling upon a god, according to method. And let this be the method — for it is necessary to say so much at least as this — Every diagram, system of number, and composition of harmony, together with the one agreement of all the stars in their revolutions, ought to be apparent to him, who learns in a proper manner. And that, of which we are speaking, will become apparent, if a person rightly learns, looking to one thing. For to those, who think upon the matter, there will appear to be naturally one bond to all of these. But if a person will take the matter in hand in any other way, he must, as we have said, call upon fortune. For, without these, no nature will become lucky in states. But this is the method, and this the nurture, and through these subjects of instruction we must proceed, whether they are difficult or easy. Nor is it lawful to neglect the gods; since the happy report, relating to all of them, has, according to a manner, become apparent. And I call him, who thus apprehends all these points, the man the most truly wise who, I stoutly affirm, both in jest and earnest, will, when he shall have filled up by death his allotted portion in things of this kind, if he be still almost dying, neither share any longer in many of his senses then, as at present; and he will, after being a partaker of one destiny alone, and becoming one out of many, be fortunate, and, at the same time, most wise and blessed; whether any one lives blessed on the continent, or in islands; and that he will participate in a fortune, which ever happens to be of this kind; and that, whether any one studies these questions, living a public or a private life, he will meet with the same fate and in a similar manner from the gods. But what we said at the beginning, the same assertion appears even now to be really true; that it is not possible for men to be perfectly blessed and happy, except a few. And this is rightly asserted by us. For such as are divine and at the same time prudent men, and naturally participate in the rest of virtue, and in addition have acquired all, that is closely connected with a blessed instruction, and such things as we have mentioned, to these alone have the gifts of fortune fallen by lot, and are in a sufficient state. To those then, who have laboured in this way upon such points, we say privately and lay down publicly as a law, that the greatest offices ought to be given to those, who have arrived at the period of an old man; and that all the others ought to follow them, and with good words hymn all the gods and goddesses; and lastly, that all of us, after having known and sufficiently examined the nocturnal assembly, most correctly exhort it to this wisdom.


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